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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case represents an appeal under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and the Local 
Land Use Planning Act from a final Order of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners finding 
that Douglas and Michelle Stafford violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374 (Kootenai 
County's current Site Disturbance Ordinance). The Staffords established that the actions alleged to 
constitute violations of Ordinance No. 374 were undertaken by the Staffords and known to the 
County prior to the effective date of said Ordinance. The Staffords contend that they have been 
improperly and retroactively cited under an Ordinance with an effective date that post-dates the 
actions for which they have been cited. The Board of Commissioners disagreed. The Staffords 
appealed to the District Court pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.C. §§67-6521 and the 
IdahoAdministrativeProceduresAct,I.C. §§67-5270 through 67-5277. The District Court affirmed 
the Board's determination thatthe Staffordshad violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374. This 
appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On September 7, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department caused to 
be issued to the Staffords, under the heading "Case No. CV-07-0092," a "Notice of Violation." See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 005. 1 The Notice of Violation alleged that the Staffords had violated Kootenai County 
Ordinance No. 374 by causing "site disturbance within twenty-five foot set-back." Id. 
On March 19, 2008, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (hereafter "the 
Included in the record on appeal are seven (7) volumes ofthe "Agency Record." The 
"Agency Record" will be referred to herein by the acronym "AR." The "Clerk's Record" will be 
referred to by the acronym "R." 
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Department") provided the Staffords with a "Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation." See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0136. That Notice again alleged that the Staffords had violated Kootenai County 
Ordinance No. 374. The Department advised the Staffords that they had forty-five (45) days within 
which to file an administrative appeal from the Department's determination that they had violated 
Ordinance No. 374. 
On March 21, 2008, the Staffords timely appealed the Department's administrative 
determination that they had violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0138. 
The Staffords' appeal came on before a Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. See AR, Vol. II, p. 
0317 The Hearing Examiner rejected the Staffords' argument, finding that they had violated 
Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0468-0474. 
The Staffords appealed the Hearing Examiner's Decision to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners (hereafter "the Board"). Id. at pp. 0475-0476. On March 19, 2009, the Board 
entered its Order of Decision, rejecting the Staffords' argument. The Board found that the Staffords 
had violated Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0615-0624. That Decision was amended on 
April 16, 2009. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0628-0636. 
The Staffords timely filed an appeal from the Board's Order and Amended Order to the 
District Court. R., pp. 6 and 25. The Staffords' appeal was made pursuant to the Local Land Use 
Planning Act, I.e. §§67-6521, and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. §§67-5270 through 
67-5277. The Staffords sought review, from the District Court in its appellate capacity, of that 
certain "Amended Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Decision" entered by the Board on April 16, 2009. R., pp. 45-53. Following briefing and argument, 
the District Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal," affirming the Board's 
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Order and Amended Order finding a violation under Ordinance No. 374. This appeal followed. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Ordinance No. 251. 
Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251" is contained in the record at AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0046-0066. Ordinance No. 251 took effect on January 1, 1997. Id. at p. 0062. Ordinance 
No. 251 provided, with respect to lots with frontage on Lake Coeur d'Alene, that "an undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. . .. The buffer shall be a minimum of 
twenty-five feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body [elevation 2125.0 
(N.G.V.D. 1929 Datum)]." Id. at pp. 0057-58.2 
Ordinance No. 251 defines a "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" as: 
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, 
including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, 
roads, structures, or surface and storm water facilities. Buffer areas 
shall be left in their natural state. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0049. 
The purpose of Ordinance No. 251, as stated therein, is: 
The purpose of this ordinance shall be to protect property, surface 
water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from 
excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earth works, soil erosion, 
sedimentation, and storm water run-off and to provide maximum 
safety in the development and design of building sites, roads, and 
other surface amenities. 
2Coeur d'Alene Lake elevation 2125.0 at N. G. V.D. datum equates to elevation 2128 using 
Washington Water Power (now Avista) datum. Elevation 2128 is the level artificially maintained 
during the summer months by the A vista dams on the Spokane River, the natural outlet to Lake 
Coeur d' Alene. See, generally, In re: Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006). 
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Id. at p. 0046.3 
2. Ordinance No. 283. 
Kootenai County "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283" became effective July 26, 1999. R., 
p.64. The stated "purpose" of Ordinance No. 283 did not differ from that stated in Ordinance No. 
251. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer," as contained in Ordinance No. 283, 
did not differ from that contained in Ordinance No. 251. The prohibition against development 
activity within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back from elevation 2128 was also unchanged from that 
contained in Ordinance No. 251. 
3. Ordinance No. 374. 
Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374" was adopted effective December 
12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. The stated "purpose" ofthe Ordinance did not change from the 
purpose declared in Ordinance Nos. 251 and 283. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation 
buffer" also went unchanged. Id. at p. 0081. So too did the prohibition against development activity 
within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone from elevation 2128. Id. at p. 0089. 
Ordinance No. 374 contained the following specific language: 
The provisions ofthis Ordinance [374] shall supersede the provisions 
of Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093 (emphasis added). Ordinance No. 374 also specifically stated that it "shall 
take effect and be in full force" on December 12, 2005. Id. 
30rdinance No. 251 provides, at Section 13, that violations may be considered a criminal 
misdemeanor and punishable by a maximum fine of$300 or six (6) months injail, or both. See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0061. 
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4. The Stafford Property. 
The Stafford property consists of a three-quarter acre lot on Lake Coeur d' Alene. See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0028. The Staffords purchased the property in 1999. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057.4 
Dr. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony, before the Board, that development activity had 
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone on the property prior to 1999. 
[W]hen we bought the property in 1999 - that area - the development 
that we're on was logged. Urn, the area down by the Lake actually 
was used as a slash pile. When we bought the property, there was a 
slash pile that they - it appears that they attempted to bury it - dug 
about a three foot hole and they stuck and filled it up with about eight 
or nine foot slash - slash pile of stumps of logs and things. Urn, the 
property was tom up. It uh - noxious weeds on there. Canadian thistle 
and knapweed. 
See Tr., Vol. I, p. 20. Dr. Stafford also offered unrebutted testimony before the Board that the 
property had sand within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone at the time he purchased it. See Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 0058. 
5. The Staffords' First Building Permit Application. 
The Staffords submitted an application for a building permit on the property in July of 1999. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0028. The Staffords sought to build a single family residence. Id. The permit was 
issued in July of 1999 and construction began. Id. Construction of the Stafford home was 
completed in 2000. The Department signed off on the Staffords' initial "Certificate of Occupancy" 
on March 23, 2000. Id. at pp. 0039-0040. 
4 There is one volume of transcript included in the Appellate Record. It consists ofthe 
"Clerk's Transcript" from administrative proceedings held before Kootenai County. This transcript 
will be referred to herein by the acronym "Tr." 
5 
6. Subsequent Work Within the Twenty-Five Foot Set-Back Area. 
In the summer of 2000, as confirmed by photographs offered by the Department, the 
Staffords had accomplished minimal clean-up efforts of the prior development activity that had 
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0010. In 2001, Dr. 
Stafford desired to clean-up the prior development activity that had occurred within the twenty-five 
(25) foot set-back zone on his property. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. 
Prior to undertaking any action, Dr. Stafford went to the Department for advice: 
[W]e finished our house in 2000 and moved in. In the summer of .. 
. 2001, we decided that we would like to do something that would 
clean that up. It was a - it was a mess. At that time, we did hire a 
landscaper. Uh, talked to him - came up with some plans. I personally 
went down to Planning and Zoning and talked to the lady behind the 
counter. I don't know her name, but it was in 2001. And specifically 
asked her, and told her our situation, it had been tom up uh was there 
a problem with us planting grass and trees. And she told us that re-
greening was never a problem. And okay, so if I plant grass and 
plants and trees down there, its not a problem. She repeated re-
greening is not a problem. So we went ahead .... 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0057-0058. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony that the improvements were 
completed in 2001: 
I have since cleaned up the beach a little bit and moved some rocks 
around and things like that, but urn, so in 2001, our project was 
completed down there and as the photographs and records show we 
were not trying to hide anything - it was there. 
Id. at p. 0058. Photographs offered by the Department show that by July of 2002, the Stafford 
property had been cleaned up, including areas within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0013. This included the addition of sand to the sand that previously existed (as 
confirmed by Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), "re-greening" as verbally approved by the 
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Department (as also confinned by Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), and a portion of a barbeque 
pit that will be discussed more fully below. Illustrative photographs are included in the Agency 
Record at Vol. I, pp. 0011-0025. 
At the time the improvements were completed (July of2001), the operative Site Disturbance 
Ordinance in effect was Ordinance No. 283. 
7. The Staffords Apply for a Second Building Permit for an 
Addition to Their Home. 
In August of2005, the Staffords applied for a new building pennit to authorize construction 
of an addition to their home. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0067. The pennit was approved by Kootenai County 
in October of2005. Id. 
As part ofthe submittals to Kootenai County, in support oftheir request for a building pennit 
for the addition, the Staffords submitted a "Site Plan" prepared by a professional engineer. See AR, 
Vol. II, p. 0269. This plan is referred to herein as "the Site Plan." The Site Plan depicted the twenty-
five (25) foot set-back "from vegetation line" (summer elevation of 2128 WWP (Avista datum)). 
Id. That set-back line is shown to run through the center of the barbeque pit that Dr. Stafford 
installed in the summer of2001. Id. The Site Plan (as it will be referred to herein) was signed and 
approved by the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department on October 13, 2005. Id. 
Representatives ofthe County came out to inspect the Stafford construction project, which, 
pursuant to the Site Disturbance pennit issued by the County, included silt fences at or near the 
shoreline. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0059. These individuals raised no objection or comment to the 
improvements that Dr. Stafford had made some four and a half years earlier. Id. 
Effective December 12,2005, Kootenai County Ordinance No.3 74 was adopted, specifically 
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superseding Ordinance No. 283 (which was in effect when the Staffords completed their 
improvements within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone in July of2001). 
8. The Staffords are Cited for Violating Ordinance No. 374. 
The Staffords made request for a Certificate of Occupancy on the addition to their home that 
was authorized by the 2005 building permit. This request came in August of2007. As part of that 
final inspection, the Department issued a "Notice of Violation" (the Notice of Violation at issue in 
this proceeding), claiming that the Staffords had violated Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374 
(effective December 12, 2005) based upon the improvements that the Department acknowledges 
were completed in July of 2001 (when Ordinance No. 283 was in effect and had not yet been 
superseded). See AR, Vol. I, p. 0005. 
9. The Department Refuses to Issue a Certificate of 
Occupancy Based Upon the Claim that the Staffords Had 
Violated Ordinance No. 374. 
On November 21,2007, the Staffords, through counsel, wrote the Department's Director. See 
AR, Vol. I, pp. 0106-0108. The Staffords attempted to resolve the matter, given the then pending 
holidays, and the County's position that the Staffords could not occupy the completed addition to 
their home based upon alleged site disturbance violations occurring six (6) years earlier (and prior 
to the adoption and effective date ofthe Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) relied upon by the County. 
The County did not respond. 
On December 5,2007, the Staffords renewed their request to resolve the matter. See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0105. The County did not respond. 
On January 15,2008, after the holidays had passed, and some two (2) months later, the 
County responded, refusing to consider the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy. See AR, Vol. 
8 
I, pp. 0113-0114. 
After subsequent efforts to resolve the matter failed, the Department gave the Staffords notice 
that the Department would be recording a "Notice of Violation," asserting a violation under 
Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0127-0130. The Staffords then filed their appeal which 
gives rise to this proceeding. Id. at p. 0138. 
10. Proceedings Before the Board of County Commissioners. 
The Staffords argued to the Board that they had been improperly cited under Ordinance No. 
374. Ordinance No. 374, effective December 12,2005, specifically "superseded" Ordinance no. 283. 
Ordinance No. 283 was in effect in the summer of 2001 when the subject improvements were 
completed. Ordinance No. 374 could not form the basis for a violation based upon action that 
preceded the effective date ofthe Ordinance. 
The Board rejected the Staffords argument.s The Staffords argued at hearing to the Board in 
part as follows: 
It is important to note that the process that we are involved in ... the 
charge against the Staffords is a violation of Ordinance 374. That is 
what they have been charged with. Now, if somebody makes a claim 
about a violation of 283 or 251, that's not the violation alleged here 
today and then there will be an argument in that context as well, but 
this is 374 only. 
See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0087. 
The Board noted that Ordinance No. 283 was in effect at the time the subject improvements 
were completed. Commissioner Tondee stated: 
SThe Board did find that the Staffords would not be required to move the barbeque pit that 
was depicted on the Site Plan specifically approved by the Department as part of the remodel 
application. See AR, Vol. II, p. 0269. See also, Tr., Vol. I, p. 0083. 
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The new ordinance going forward would be 374. That does not negate 
that the time period that ordinance was in effect prior or the previous 
ordinance 283 was in effect prior to that . . . [T]he work was done 
there was an ordinance in effect that did not allow the work that was 
done in 2001. Uh, and the work that was done in 2001 was done 
without a permit .... We're saying the work was done without a 
permit and it's in violation of our ordinances to do work in that area 
so from my understanding ... there needs to be a remediation plan 
and it needs to put it back. 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0091-0092. 
Commissioner Piazza agreed. "I do believe that 283 was in effect at the time [the 
improvements were completed]." See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0095. To date, no charge has ever been made 
against the Staffords under Ordinance No. 283. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
1. Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was erroneous 
as a matter oflaw? 
2. Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was arbitrary, 
capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence? 
3. Whether the County is estopped to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 374? 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. Applicable Standards on Appeal. 
The Staffords bring this appeal from the Board's Order of Decision and Amended Order of 
Decision pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I. C. § §67 -6521 and the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, I.C. §§67-5270 through 67-5277. Pursuant to Section 67-6521 ofthe LLUPA, an 
effected person aggrieved by a decision to deny a permit authorizing the development of real 
property may seekjudicial review as provided in §67-5201, et seq. (IDAP A). Pursuant to I.C. § 67-
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5279 of the IDAPA, the Board's Order of Decision is subject to reversal ifthis Court finds that the 
Board's "findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions" are: 
(1) In violation of Constitutional provisions; 
(2) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(3) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(4) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
See I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a), (c), (d), and (e). 
On appeal, this Court is to review the Board's decision under the LLUP A and IDAP A 
independently ofthe decision ofthe District Court. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 
109 P.3d 1091 (2005) (citing Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 
430,50 P.3d 443 (2002)). 
On appeal, "this Court defers to the agency's Findings of Fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Id. (citing Price v. Payette County Board of Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 
P.2d 583 (1998)). In addition: 
The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) 
are made upon unlawful procedures; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.... The party 
attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner 
specified in Idaho Code §67 -5279(3), and then it must show that it's substantial right 
has been prejudiced .... 
Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho at 352 (additional citations omitted). 
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B. The Board's Decision Sustaining the Violation Alleged Under Ordinance 
No. 374 Was Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
1. The Adoption of Ordinance No. 374 Post-Dated the 
Conduct Alleged to Constitute the Violation. 
Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12, 2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. 
There is no dispute that the actions giving rise to the violation were performed in the summer of 
2001. Dr. Stafford has so testified. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. The Department's photographs confirm 
as much. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Since the charging Ordinance (No. 374) was effective 
prospectively from December 12, 2005, and since the complaint of conduct is conceded by the 
County to have occurred in July of 200 1, the charge under the ordinance relied upon by the County 
cannot stand. The Board's Decision to the contrary was in error as a matter of law. 
2. Ordinance No. 283 is Irrelevant to this Proceeding. 
The Commissioners, in deliberations reflected by the transcript, seemingly determined that 
there was "no harm - no foul" since Ordinance No. 283, in effect between July 26, 1999 and 
December 11,2005 (which encompasses the period when the encroachments were placed in service) 
had language similar to Ordinance No. 374. This too was in error as a matter oflaw. 
First, the Staffords were not charged under Ordinance No. 283. The charging document, 
which carries criminal penalties, was based solely upon Ordinance No. 374. SeeAR, Vol. I, p. 0005. 
Second, Ordinance No. 283 no longer exists. Ordinance No. 374 specifically provided that 
it "superseded" Ordinance No. 283. SeeAR, Vol. I, p. 0093. "Supersede" in this context, is distinct 
from "amend." It is noteworthy that the word "amend" was not used. 
"Supersede" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows: 
"Obliterate, set aside, annul, replace, make void, inefficacious or 
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useless, repealed." 
"Annul," one ofthe alternative definitions for "supersede," is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as: 
"To make void or of no effect." 
In contrast, "amend" is defined as "to change, correct, revise, improve." The difference 
between "supersede" and "amend," in the legal sense, is that "supersede" undoes all that went before 
it and starts anew. "Amend," on the other hand, keeps what was done before but simply changes it. 
The use of the term "supersede" in Section 15 of Ordinance No. 374 "obliterated," 
"annulled," and "rendered of no force and effect" the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance 
No. 283). Ordinance No. 374, the very Ordinance upon which the subject violation is based, is 
effective only from December 12,2005 forward. In other words, and without conceding the same, 
ifthere was an arguable violation ofthe prior Site Disturbance Ordinance, and ifthat violation was 
not pursued administratively to a conclusion prior to December 12,2005, the violation is essentially 
"grandfathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No. 374.6 
Third, Ordinance No. 283, like Ordinance No. 374, carries criminal penalties. A violation 
of the Ordinance is a criminal misdemeanor "and shall be punishable by a maximum fine of $300 
or six (6) months in jail, or both." While Ordinance No. 283 provides that "[e]ach day a violation 
shall constitute a separate offense," the last day Ordinance No. 283 was in effect was on December 
6The resolution ofthis issue is not essential to finding in the Staffords favor. It is enough for 
this Court to determine that the Staffords were charged under the incorrect Ordinance. It is 
noteworthy, however, that since the Staffords were charged with a criminal violation under 
Ordinance No. 374, and since that violation has proceeded to a final determination, the Staffords 
might well be SUbjected to double jeopardy in violation of the U.S. Constitution in the event the 
County hereafter attempts to cite them in subsequent proceedings under Ordinance No. 283 
(notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 283 has been "superseded," "annulled," and "made void 
or of no effect"). 
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11, 2005. From December 12, 2005 forward, Ordinance No.3 74 applied in that it had "superseded" 
Ordinance No. 283. 
Accordingly, the last day that the Staffords could be claimed to have violated Ordinance No. 
283 was December 11, 2005 . Yet since that conduct is, in the language of the ordinance, a criminal 
misdemeanor, the period oflimitations contained in I.C. § 19-403 applies: 
A prosecution for any misdemeanor must be commenced by the filing of the 
complaint or the finding of an indictment within one (1) year after its commission. 
To date, the Staffords have never been charged with a violation under Ordinance No. 283.7 
3. If the Staffords Did Engage in Citable Conduct (a Point 
Not Conceded), Then the Chargeable Offense Was Under 
Ordinance No. 283. 
The conduct giving rise to the charge occurred three and one-half years before Kootenai 
County Ordinance No. 374 became effective. Ordinance No. 374 cannot be applied retroactively to 
criminalize conduct that occurred prior to its adoption date. See,~, State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 
166,627 P.2d 788 (1981). 
"The fundamental principle that 'the required criminal law must have existed when 
the conduct in issue occurred,' Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd Ed. 
1960), at 58-59, must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from 
courts as well as from legislatures .... " 
State v. Byers, 102 Idaho at 166 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,354,84 Sup. Ct. 
1697, 1702-03 (1964». There can be no question that Ordinance No. 374 is criminal in nature in 
7 The same result would hold true under the limitations applicable to any civil claim 
brought or sought to be brought by the County based upon an alleged violation under Ordinance No. 
283. See,~, I.C. §5-224 ("An action for relief not herein before provided for must be commenced 
within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued."). Any civil enforcement action 
that could have been brought based upon an alleged violation under Ordinance No. 283 should have 
been brought before December 11, 2009. No such action has ever been brought by the County 
seeking civil enforcement under Ordinance No. 283. 
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that it specifically provides that violations may constitute criminal misdemeanors and shall be 
punishable by a fine of$300 or six (6) months in jail or both. 
The District Court disagreed with the analysis suggested by the Staffords. In so doing, the 
District Court erred. The Court concluded that Ordinance No. 374 was not penal in nature since the 
violation ofthe same "may" constitute a misdemeanor. The District Court determined, "the use of 
the word 'may' makes it discretionary." R., p. 141. Yet the ordinance further provides that a 
violation shall "be punishable by a maximum fine of $300 or six (6) months in jail, or both." In 
other words, the ordinance says that a violation may be considered a criminal misdemeanor or the 
violation may also result in civil action. However, the ordinance states that a violation shall be 
punishable as a misdemeanor. In other words, there is nothing discretionary about the statute. It 
specifically provides that a violation is criminal in nature. What Kootenai County has done is repeal 
Ordinance No. 283 and prospectively criminalized conduct that was previously described in that 
ordinance. Under the facts of this case, this results in an inequitable scenario creating prejudice on 
the part of the Staffords. 
The situation here is not one in which the County was left without a remedy. At all points 
in time, the County could have brought a criminal charge or enforcement action against the Staffords 
under Ordinance No. 283. It did not. The County wiped the slate clean, did away with Ordinance 
No. 283 (while alleged violations existed on the Stafford property), and then charged the Staffords 
with a violation penal in nature under a statute of prospective application. This was ofthe County's 
doing, not the Staffords. Based upon the method and manner by which this action has proceeded, 
the County Board erred in finding that a violation under Ordinance No. 374 had been established, 
simply because one could have been established under No. 283, at some point in time, and the 
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Board's decision should be vacated accordingly. 
4. Ordinance No. 337 Has No Effect On These Proceedings. 
In proceedings before the District Court, Kootenai County cited §§1-2-3 of the Kootenai 
County Code, adopted via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337 on August 30, 2004. R., pp. 101-02. 
Section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code provides: 
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether 
such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed 
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty forfeiture or 
punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the former 
ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or 
so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or 
claimed arising before the new ordinance takes effect.. .. 
See K.C.C. §1-2-3 (R., pp. 101-02). 
The cited language relied upon by Kootenai County, as contained in § 1-2-3, actually supports 
the argument of the Staffords. The language relied upon by Kootenai County supports the 
proposition that if the Staffords were to be charged with any offense, it should have been under 
Ordinance No. 283 (in effect at the time ofthe alleged violations) rather than Ordinance No.3 74 (the 
adoption of which post -dated the commission ofthe alleged violations). However, Kootenai County 
has never brought civil or criminal proceedings against the Staffords based upon Ordinance No. 283 
and, for reasons previously advanced, the time for so doing is now passed. 
5. The County May Not Use These Proceedings to Establish 
a Violation of an Act Not Charged Under Ordinance No. 
283. 
The County argues, consistent with the decision of the Commissioners, that this case 
presents, in essence, a case of "no harm-no foul" as the cited conduct is alleged to run afoul of both 
Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374. To this end, as an implicit means to "end-run" the ex 
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post/acto infinnities arising from the application of Ordinance No. 374, the County argues: "It is 
true that from that date forward [December 12, 2005], Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or 
effect. This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect until 
December 12, 2005, however." R., p. 90 (emphasis in original). A Defendant is entitled to notice 
of the charges against him. The charging authority must prove the offense charged and the 
Defendant is not subject to conviction for other offenses even ifthose offenses were proven at trial. 
See,~, State v. Washington, 20 Or. App. 350, 531 P.2d 743, affinned, 273 Or. 829 (1975). The 
Staffords were never charged with violating Ordinance No. 283. 
6. The Board's Determination Was Contrary to the 
Language of Ordinance No. 374 as Applied to These 
Facts. 
The stated purpose of Ordinance No. 374 is "to protect property, surface water, and ground 
water against significant adverse effects from excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil 
erosion, sedimentation, and stonn water run-off .... " See AR, Vol. I, p. 0078. There is no showing 
on these facts that the placement of a barbeque pit (specifically authorized and condoned by the 
Department), the replacement of previously-existing sand (an undisputed proposition based upon the 
facts of record), the placement of basalt rocks indigenous to the very property (another point not 
disputed by the record), and the placement oflawn upward from the Lake (but within the twenty-five 
(25) foot set-back) with the County's oral pennission and knowledge, creates any "significant 
adverse effects." 
Moreover, the County claims that Ordinance No.3 74 was to promote an "undisturbed natural 
vegetation buffer." Yet an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" is defined as "an area where no 
development activity has occurred or will occur, including, but not limited to, logging .... " See 
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AR, Vol. I, p. 0081. 
There is no dispute, based upon Dr. Stafford's testimony, which was unrebutted, that the 
subj ect property, prior to the Staffords' purchase of the same in 1999, was logged, developed, and 
used, all within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone, for what is defined by the Ordinance as 
"development activity." If the purpose of leaving an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer is to 
preclude development activity, then that purpose is irrelevant when development activity has already 
occurred before the effective date of the Ordinance. Does the County really suggest that the 
Staffords are to leave an undisturbed slash pile and noxious weeds on the property? There wasn't 
an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" in place when Ordinance No. 374 (or Ordinance No. 283 
for that matter) became effective based on the unrebutted facts of this case. Hence, there was no 
"undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" to maintain. 
C. The Board's Determination Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and Constituted 
an Abuse of Discretion. 
The Board's Decision, based upon the factors and authorities set forth above, would primarily 
consist of the specific language of Ordinance No. 374 and well-accepted principles of statutory 
construction, suggests that the Board's application ofthe Ordinance to support a violation under the 
facts at bar was arbitrary, capricious, and to the extent necessary, constituted an abuse of discretion. 
At the very least, the application of Ordinance No. 374 to these facts, sufficient to find a violation, 
was unsupported by substantial evidence or, essentially, any evidence. 
D. The County is Estopped to Claim a Violation Under Ordinance No. 374. 
It is a general proposition that estoppel does not apply to governmental agencies. However, 
it has been held that the people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same 
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rules of honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private citizen, and should no more be allowed 
to lull a citizen to repose and confidence in what would otherwise be a false and erroneous position 
than should the private citizen. See Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 
260, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). Consider the facts at bar. 
Dr. Stafford, upon moving into his house, goes to the Kootenai County Building and 
Planning Department and asks what he can do within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He 
asks if he can plant vegetation. He is specifically advised that "re-greening" is not a problem. He 
asks a second time. He is again told that "re-greening" is not a problem. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0066. 
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Stafford plants vegetation within the twenty-five (25) foot set-
back zone. He also replaces or adds to previously-existing sand (a point established by the record) 
and places basalt boulders indigenous to the area within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He 
also completed the installation of a barbeque pit that is only partially within the twenty-five (25) foot 
set-back zone. 
And what does the County do? The County sends someone out to take pictures of the 
Stafford property in 2001 and 2002. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Anned with photographs of 
the very substance of what it now claims to constitute a violation, what does the County do? 
Nothing. Five years pass. 
In the interim, the Staffords apply for a permit to build an addition to their home. This 
requires a second Site Disturbance permit. Silt fences are placed at or near the twenty-five (25) foot 
set-back zone. The County inspects the project. No one says anything. In fact, the County actually 
signs off on a Site Plan submitted by the Staffords that shows that the barbeque pit, placed in service 
five years earlier, partially lies within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. II, p. 
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0269. 
It is only when the Staffords request a Certificate of Occupancy, and the home addition is 
completed, that the County claims a violation of an Ordinance (374) that wasn't even in effect when 
the County took the pictures of the offending encroachments (in 2001 and 2002) but chose to do 
nothing. 
This isn't a case where the Staffords have been charged with violating Ordinance No. 283. 
The inapplicability of Ordinance No. 374 has been raised and noticed to the County at all times 
through proceedings below, but the County has done nothing but press onward under an Ordinance 
that unquestionably post-dates the offense charged. 
Under these unique facts, the County should be estopped to claim a violation under 
Ordinance No. 374. The Court should so hold. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants Douglas and Michelle 
Stafford respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai County 
Board of Commissioners, and find that, as a matter oflaw, there has been no violation of Ordinance 
No. 374 (the same Ordinance being inapplicable to the facts at bar). The Staffords further request 
entry of an order remanding the matter with instructions that the violation be dismissed and that 
recorded notice of the same be removed from the real property records of Kootenai County. 
DATED this 2 y;~ day of June, 2010. 
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